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Abstract
This article approaches the concept of risk from a Chinese perspective and traces 
its evolution throughout the history of Chinese thought, from the classics to the 
present. It analyzes underlying elements that have given rise to its current form, in 
comparison with elements of the same concept in the West, and describes how the 
perception of risk has helped shape the guidelines of China's ongoing transforma-
tion, as in the case of 'peaceful development' and a 'harmonious world'. It identi-
ﬁes the main domestic and foreign risks that threaten the sustainability of China's 
development, and discusses the concept of 'comprehensive national power'.1
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The standard deﬁnition of risk ponders the probability of something 
happening with the cost of its happening. In this sense, a high prob-
ability with a low cost is not as much a risk as a lower probability with 
a higher cost. In 1662, the monastery of Port Royal published the fol-
lowing deﬁnition of risk in the anonymous Ars Cogitandi text: 'Fear of 
harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of harm, but 
also to the probability of the event' (Hacking 1975: 77; Bernstein 1998: 
383; Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre i Benach 2005). A useful strategy for 
risk analysis is forecasting possible risk scenarios, calculating their cost, 
and designing possible responses (risk management). This is the strategy 
known as 'Murphy's Law': if something can go wrong it will go wrong 
(with its corollary: if something can go wrong in more ways than one, 
it will go wrong in the worst way possible). Other popular versions of 
the strategy for managing risks are 'Plans A, B and C' (or more), or the 
best-case and worst-case scenarios and various scenarios in between. 
Risk analysis can be quantitative or qualitative, or a combination of both. 
For quantitative analysis, the factors to be considered are probability 
and cost; for qualitative analysis, they are threats and vulnerabilities on 
the one hand, and controls and countermeasures on the other. A special 
case is uncertainty, a source of risk that is not amenable to calculation. 
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This article presents a Chinese perspective on risk calculation methods 
and examples of analyses that Chinese experts have made.
Risk Scenarios in Classical Chinese Thought 
Classical Chinese culture embodied its vision of risk scenarios in the 
mid-ﬁrst millennium BC in the text known as 孫子兵法 Sunzi bingfa 
(The Art of War [兵法] attributed to Sunzi [孫子]), which identiﬁes ﬁve 
factors that determine victory or defeat in war (Table 1) (Sunzi bingfa; 
cf. Golden & Presas 2007; Ramírez 2006; Minford 2002; Galvany 2001; 
Ames 1993; Grifﬁth 1971).
TABLE 1: The Five Factors that Determine Victory or Defeat  
in Sunzi bingfa
道 dao the way, the route, the authority or moral force of the ruler
天 tian the sky, daytime or night time, atmospheric conditions, the seasons,  
the cosmos
地 di the land, terrain, distances, sovereignty
將 jiang the general, the chain of command
法 fa order, organization, military training, military discipline 
Source: Sunzi bingfa, Chapter 1.2
The rulers and their military strategists pondered these ﬁve factors in 
the temple of the ancestors in order to ponder or calculate (筭 suan) their 
weight relative to each side of combatants. Chinese strategists would 
appear to have invented a form of game theory three millennia ago: 
Victory belongs to the side that has more points in the calculations made 
in the temple before entering into battle; defeat belongs to the side that has 
fewer points in the calculations made in the temple before entering into 
battle (Sunzi bingfa, Chapter 1). 
Calculating factors such as the time of day, the weather and the climate 
or seasonal effects on the one hand, and those of terrain or distances on 
the other, would seem to be fairly objective. But it would also appear that 
they had methods for calculating non-empirical factors as well, such as 
the moral authority of the rulers that would guarantee loyalty from their 
subjects, the strategic ability of the generals and the efﬁcacy of the military 
training and discipline of the troops. Could The Art of War be a precedent 
or a harbinger of the strategic capacity of China's leaders today? 
An example of qualitative analysis that has become very well known 
is the following:
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Who knows the enemy as well as he knows himself will always win, even in 
100 battles. Who does not know the enemy but does know himself will suffer 
one defeat for every victory. Who knows neither himself nor the enemy will 
lose every battle (Sunzi bingfa, Chapter 3). 
At ﬁrst glance, these statements seem to refer to psychological quali-
ties, but they are repeated later in a different context that is entirely 
empirical, dedicated to the analysis of the terrain of the battleﬁeld, the 
strong and weak points of the troops, the strategic value of the place-
ment of the troops, etc.:
Know the enemy and know oneself and never doubt the victory, even in 
100 battles. Know the Sky [atmospheric conditions, climate], know the 
Earth [terrains, distances], and every victory will be complete (Sunzi bingfa, 
Chapter 10). 
The ability to envisage scenarios and calculate previsions for risks is 
deﬁned in a key way as the relationship between a pair of correlative 
concepts (like 陰陽 yinyang) that constitute the essence of the calculations 
that a strategist must make: 利 li (proﬁt, advantage) and 害 hai (damage, 
loss, disadvantage). The more beneﬁt or advantage there is, the less loss 
or disadvantage, and vice versa. This correlation constitutes the essence 
of the calculations that a strategist should make: 
A wise leader must consider the amalgam of advantage and disadvantage 
inherent in every situation. A leader capable of discerning the possible 
disadvantages of an apparently advantageous situation may be entrusted 
to carry out a plan. A leader capable of discovering the possible advantages 
of apparently disadvantageous circumstances will be capable of salvaging 
the situation (Sunzi bingfa, Chapter 8). 
Sunzi bingfa repeatedly insists on ﬂexibility and the necessity to 
adapt strategies and tactics to conditions that by their very nature are 
constantly changing. There are no ﬁxed and permanent strategies and 
no strategy or tactic can be repeated exactly the same way because no 
two sets of conditions will ever be the same. Orthodox strategies are 
predictable, unexpected ones are not, although in some circumstances 
what might not be expected is precisely an orthodox response. 
From the beginning, Chinese socio-political thought has shown a 
marked aversion to 亂 [乱] luan (disorder, chaos) (Guo 1975; Hsiao 1979; 
Louie 1986; He & Bu 1998; Louie & Hodge 1998). The graphic etymology 
of the Chinese character luan is a pair of hands unravelling a fabric. To 
change the direction of the People's Republic of China in the late 1970s, 
after the death of 毛泽东 Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Deng Xiaoping pro-
posed a risk management strategy of 拨乱反正 boluan fanzheng, 'bring 
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order out of chaos and return to rectitude' (Barmé 1993). This meant 
putting an end to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and restoring 
political, economic and social development on the pragmatic basis of 
不管白猫, 黑猫, 逮住老鼠就是好猫  buguan bai mao hei mao lizhu laoshu 
jiu shi hao mao, 'it does not matter whether the cat is white or black as 
long it catches mice', and the ﬂexible experimentation of 摸着石头过河 
mozhe shitou guohe, 'crossing the river by feeling for the stones'. In Deng's 
formulation for restoring order, which involves the pursuit of risk man-
agement strategies, the opposite of 乱 luan (disorder) is 正 zheng (order, 
rectitude). In general terms, however, the opposite of 乱 luan (disorder) 
in Chinese socio-political thought is 和 he (harmony, peace, coexistence). 
This is the same concept that animates the discourse of 胡锦涛 Hu Jintao 
today: 和谐社会 hexie shehui (harmonious society), 和谐世界 hexie shijie 
(harmonious world.) The major source for taking harmony as the basis 
for strategic thinking is Confucius. The Lunyu 論語 [论语] or 'Anal-
ects' that recorded his teachings give preference to harmony over force: 
'Duke Huan brought the nine feudal lords together, not by the use of war 
chariots [military force], but through Guan Zhong's inﬂuence' (桓公九合
諸侯、不以兵車、管仲之力也, 論語 Lunyu XIV.17.2). For Confucius, 管
仲 Guan Zhong (d. 645 BCE) was an exemplary minister who governed 
on the basis of propriety, appropriateness, altruism and learning. 'The 
exemplary person seeks harmony but not uniformity; the petty-minded 
person seeks uniformity but not harmony' (君子和而不同、小人同而不和, 
論語 Lunyu XIII.23). Another classical statement of the role of harmony 
in state affairs is attributed to 晏子 Yanzi (d. 493 BCE).
Harmony is the reconciling of differences into a harmonious unity. [The 
Confucian text 左傳 Zuo Zhuan] reports a speech by the statesman 
[Yanzi], in which he makes a distinction between harmony and uniformity 
or identity. Harmony, he says, may be illustrated by cooking. Water, vinegar, 
pickles, salt, and plums are used to cook ﬁsh. From these ingredients there 
results a new taste which is neither that of the vinegar nor of the pickles. 
Uniformity or identity, on the other hand, may be likened to the attempt 
to ﬂavor water with water, or to conﬁne a piece of music to one note. In 
both cases there is nothing new. … Herein lies the distinction between the 
Chinese words [同 tong] and [和 he]. [Tong] means uniformity or identity, 
which is incompatible with difference. Ho means harmony, which is not 
incompatible with difference; on the contrary, it results when differences 
are brought together to form a unity. … A well-organized society is a 
harmonious unity in which people of differing talents and professions occupy 
their proper places, perform their proper functions, and are all equally 
satisﬁed and not in conﬂict with one another. An ideal world is also a 
harmonious unity (Fung 1960: 174).
Golden.indd   82 17-12-2011   13:28:42
_________________________________________________________________________83
______China's Perception of Risk and the Concept of Comprehensive National Power
Risk Scenarios in Contemporary Chinese Thought 
The Chinese term 危機 weiji (danger, risk, crisis) combines the concepts 
of 危wei (danger) and 機ji (opportunity). It refers to the critical moment 
of a situation—時機shiji—and implicates the possibility of a positive as 
well as a negative result in a situation of risk. Every outcome depends 
on the speciﬁc analysis of potential risk scenarios and the planning and 
implementation of speciﬁc risk management strategies. 
The analysis of risk scenarios from a Chinese perspective should be 
carried out in a double context: domestic and foreign. It should also 
consider the global implications of China's emergence as a new economic 
superpower. The varying paradigms and theoretical frameworks used to 
analyze this situation can produce different and sometimes contradictory 
results, as illustrated by the debate between 'the China threat' on the one 
hand, and 'peaceful rise' or 'peaceful development' on the other. 
The 'emergence' of China as a world power should really be seen 
more as a 're-emergence', as evidenced by the statistics shown in Table 
2 and Figure 1. 
The fall in the share of world GDP experienced by China and India 
between 1820 and the mid-twentieth century (until well past independ-
ence in the case of India and the policy of reform and opening up in the 
case of China) traces a reverse curve to the growth of the share of world 
GDP in the hands of Western Europe and the United States during the 
same period and corresponds to the peak of the industrial revolution 
and of aggressive Euro-American imperialism. The projected growth 
for China and India to 2030 corresponds to a contraction projected for 
Western Europe and the US. If the Euro-American rise resulted from a 
TABLE 2: China, Japan, India, Western Europe and the US, 1820-2030 
(Percentage of World Gross Domestic Product)
Year China Japan India Western Europe US
1820 33.0 3.0 16.0 17.0 2.0
1913 9.0 3.0 7.0 33.0 19.0
1950 5.0 3.0 4.0 26.0 27.0
1978 4.9 7.6 3.3 21.5 21.7
2001 12.0 7.0 5.0 20.0 21.0
2030 18.4 4.0 10.0 13.0 17.7
Sources: Maddison 2003, Hu 2005. 
Note: Values calculated in Geary-Khamis 1990 international dollars.
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combination of industrialization and imperialism (and if that imperial-
ism was an effect of the developmental model of industrial capitalism), 
one might think that the emergence of China and India could follow the 
same trends, and that this would cause in the future the same kind of 
disequilibrium in the world order that had been caused by imperialist 
powers in the past. This is the logic behind the arguments of analysts 
who see the emergence of China and India as a threat to the world order. 
Table 3 summarizes the needs inherent in the developmental model of 
industrialization, their imperialistic responses and the negative conse-
quences of that dual process.
The emergence of economic and military powers in Western Eu-
rope and the United States through industrialization and imperialism 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries established a devel-
opmental model that the newly emerging powers of Germany and Japan 
attempted to follow in the late nineteenth century and the ﬁrst half of 
the twentieth century. In each case, the emergence of a new superpower 
altered the world order and led to war. At the same time, the social 
transformations provoked by industrialization created underclasses 
in the metropolis. (In the case of the UK, for instance, enclosure acts to 
force the urbanization and proletarianization of the rural work-force, 
colonization of Ireland and restriction of Irish industrialization to com-
FIGURE 1: China, Japan, India, Western Europe and the US, 1820-2030 
(Percentage of World Gross Domestic Product)
Sources: Maddison 2003, Hu 2005. 
Note: Values calculated in Geary-Khamis 1990 international dollars.
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pensate for the destruction of the English agricultural base at the cost 
of both Anglo-Irish landlords and the indigenous population, the Great 
Famine, colonization of North America and the Caribbean to guarantee 
access to raw materials and markets at the cost of the English colonists 
and indigenous peoples, slavery for sugar and cotton plantations, urban 
poverty in England, etc.) 
In the post-colonial context, some of the paradigms that have served 
so far to deﬁne and analyze this problematic must be deconstructed 
(Golden 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010). The paradigm that has marked US and 
NATO geostrategic theories has been the Cold War, the containment 
of communism, seen as a major threat to the common heritage of the 
Euro-American 'Enlightenment'. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union, there was no communism left 
to contain, and this threat to the common heritage had been 'overcome'. 
Even so, the paradigm of containment of a clearly deﬁned enemy persists, 
and part of the transatlantic geo-political analysis establishment would 
like to see in the (re)emergence of China an enemy of this kind. 
The paradigm of Cold War/post-Cold War Realpolitik represents 
a vision based on a relatively short period of modern history, a view 
that prioritizes the self-interest of the former imperial powers. An-
other paradigm used to analyze the current geo-political situation is 
the paradigm of post-colonialism, which is part of a historical process 
of longer duration, beginning with colonialism and passing through 
decolonization and its consequences. From the perspective of this sec-
TABLE 3: The Needs of Industrialization and Imperialist Responses
Industrial needs: Imperialist responses:
• access to raw materials
• access to energy resources
• access to foreign markets 
• industrial work-force
• social transformations: urbanization, 
consumerism
• captive colonial raw materials
• captive colonial energy resources
• captive colonial markets
• cheap colonial work-force
• social transformations: conquest & 
administration of colonies
Traumatic domestic consequences: Traumatic colonial consequences:
• social upheaval
• obsolescence of rural lifestyles
• urbanization of the population
• creation of a proletariat
• elimination of nomadic lifestyles
• consumerism
• environmental degradation
• social upheaval
• obsolescence of indigenous cultures
• racism & classism
• exploitation of indigenous peoples
• elimination of nomadic lifestyles
• consumerism
• environmental degradation
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ond paradigm, the Cold War is part of the imperialist process: colonial-
ism/neocolonialism. But there is another crucial differentiating factor: 
post-colonialism prioritizes the interests of the former colonies over 
former colonial interests. Thus, from the former colonies' perspective 
the post-colonial paradigm perceives both les droits de l'homme and lais-
sez-faire to be products of a single, asymmetrical process that favoured 
the former metropolis over the former colonies. A major consequence 
of this process is a critical post-colonial analysis that includes the de-
construction of Euro-American paradigms and theoretical frameworks 
to reveal their basis in self-interest. The paradigms of Realpolitik and 
post-colonialism are incompatible.
A third paradigm that is used to situate this debate is the concept 
of modernity as the process of consolidating modern science and tech-
nology, free market capitalism and liberal democracy as the models 
for economic and political modernization. In this context, modernity 
continues to be a product of the Euro-American Enlightenment. If mo-
TABLE 4: Consequences for the World Order of the Emergence of 
New Superpowers
Industrializing Nation-State: Alteration of the World Order:
• UK (took 200 years to become a 
superpower, 18th-19th centuries)
• US (took 100 years to become a 
superpower, early 19th-early 20th 
centuries)
• Germany (after uniﬁcation in 
1871)
• Japan (after the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868)
• Russia / USSR (19th century; 
1917 Soviet Revolution)
• China (Maoist period, 1949-1976; 
Dengist period, 1978 to date)
• British imperialism; conquests in Ireland, 
the Americas, Africa & Asia; Opium Wars; 
Pax Britannica; two world wars; colonial 
conﬂicts; NATO; Cold War
• American imperialism; purchase of 
Louisiana & Alaska; Mexican War (expro-
priation of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico 
& California); conquest and settlement of 
North America (genocide of indigenous 
peoples); Spanish-American War (expro-
priation of Cuba & the Philippines); two 
world wars; Pax Americana; NATO; Cold 
War; hot wars (Korea, Vietnam, Latin 
America, Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq)
• German imperialism; two world wars; 
Cold War
• Japanese imperialism; 'Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere'; Paciﬁc War; Cold 
War
• Russian-Soviet imperialism; Warsaw Pact; 
Cold War 
• Civil war; Korean War; conﬂicts with 
India, USSR, Vietnam; mass political 
campaigns; 'Cultural Revolution'; threat?; 
new imperialism?; 'paciﬁc rise'?; 'paciﬁc 
development'?; 'harmonious world'?
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dernity is the term used to describe and deﬁne an era and a historical 
process that have been consolidated and have therefore come to an end, 
a question arises: what could or should come afterwards? If the follow-
ing period does not represent any change from the previous period, 
then it would simply be a continuation of it, but if it differs from the 
previous period, this post-modernity would have to represent a model 
that is distinct from and alternative to modernity. Thus, for theorists 
of post-modernity, modernity cannot serve as a model for the mod-
ernization of the former colonies, nor should it be maintained in the 
more developed societies. Post-modernism is a critique of modernity, 
as much from the viewpoint of the underclasses marginalized by the 
capitalist developmental model in the former metropolis as from the 
point of view of peoples who were colonized by imperialism, which 
was part and parcel of the same model. In this context, the Chinese 
response to analyses that judge China's (re)emergence to be a threat 
has been the theory of 和平崛起 heping jueqi ('peaceful rise') or 和平
發展 heping fazhan ('peaceful development'), based on the historical 
circumstances of the Chinese past, not on the circumstances of the 
Euro-American past (Zheng 2005; Kang 2005; for a contrasting point 
of view, see Wade 2004).
Economies of Scale and Comparisons of China 
In absolute terms of GDP, China is now the world's second largest 
economic superpower. However, in terms of GDP per capita, China is 
one of the world's poorest countries, at the same level as Angola or the 
Congo. The situation is paradoxical and unprecedented: China is both 
an economic superpower and a poor developing nation (Figure 2). 
According to the Spanish government, in a ranking based on nation-
states, and in absolute terms, Spain is the eighth largest economy in 
the world. However, it does not seem logical to compare the economic 
situation of a country like Spain, with a population of 46 million people, 
with a country like China, which has a population of more than 1,300 
million people. Other distortions arise in this kind of comparison: if the 
US state of California, with a population of 37 million people, were an 
independent country, it would be the seventh economic power in the 
world, ahead of Spain. Analyses based on the category of nation-states 
do not appear to be adequate for the situation of a global economy 
characterized by a number of trends and processes of regionalization 
and/or regionalism (Spoor & Golden 2006), as shown in Table 5.
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FIGURE 2: Total GDP and GDP per Capita (2007)
Source: Maddison 2007. 
Note: Calculated in Geary-Khamis 1990 international dollars.
TABLE 5: Classiﬁcation of Countries and Regions by Population and 
Wealth, 2007
Country/Region
Population 
(in millions)
% World  
Population
% World 
GDP
China 1,300 20.71 15.12
India 1,100 17.52 5.54
ASEAN 550 8.76 4.91
EU 27 500 7.96 20.61
USA 300 4.78 20.26
MERCOSUR 260 4.14 3.30
Indonesia 230 3.66 1.86
Brazil 190 3.03 2.48
Russia 145 2.31 2.23
Japan 127 2.02 6.60
Spain 40 0.64 1.67
California 37 0.59 2.68
Source: Maddison 2007. 
Note: California GDP is estimated as 13 per cent of US GDP.
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In the Euro-American historical circumstances, the nation-state as a 
political entity deﬁned itself by opposition to the empires of Europe, 
which were by nature much larger in terms of territory and population, 
as well as being multinational, multicultural, multilingual and multireli-
gious, completely the opposite of the emerging nation-states. According 
to this Euro-American perspective, the European empires were obsolete 
and the nation-states modern. The emergence of nation-states involved 
the disintegration of empires such as the Austro-Hungarian (although 
some of these same emerging nation-states would create and try to 
maintain their own overseas empires). Compared with the continent of 
Europe, the Chinese empire never disintegrated permanently into many 
independent nation-states. Moreover, regionalization processes tend to 
(re)create supranational entities, and in the case of Asia, in circumstances 
very different from those of Europe and the Americas (Cooper 2000; 
Andersen 2006; Wang 2007). 
The terminology of Chinese political scientists distinguishes between 
a 帝国 diguo ('empire'; 帝 di 'emperor' plus 国 guo 'country') and a 国家 
guojia ('nation-state'; 国 guo 'country' plus 家 jia 'family'), but it can also 
describe the nature of supranational entities such as the European Union 
as a process of creating a 帝国型国家 diguo xing guojia or 'nation-state 
FIGURE 3: Relationship between Population and World GDP  
(2007, in per cent)
Source: Maddison 2007. 
Note: California GDP is estimated as 13 per cent of US GDP.
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with the characteristics of an empire', precisely because it is large in 
terms of territory and population, as well as being multinational, mul-
ticultural, multilingual and multireligious (like China), In this context, 
the question can arise as to whether the nation-state is the right model 
for China, or whether the Chinese empire was historically and qualita-
tively different from European empires and whether there are aspects 
of the administration of the Chinese empire that are still relevant to the 
administration of the People's Republic (Wang 2007). In addition, the 
Chinese case may be deﬁned as a 國黨 guodang ('party-state') as a result 
of the non-separation of powers between the Communist Party and 
the state administration or the civil service (in many respects a similar 
situation to the confusion between the powers of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the emerging European nation-states before the separation 
of church and state in the Euro-American ambit). 
In addition, Chinese analysts distinguish between a 大國 daguo ('large 
country'), a 超級大國 chaojidaguo ('superpower') and a 負責國 fuzeguo ('a 
country with geo-political responsibilities'). China is a large developing 
country (daguo), the third largest country in the world in terms of terri-
tory after Russia and Canada, with the largest population in the world, 
and this factor of scale greatly complicates its administration and search 
for suitable models to modernize and democratize the state administra-
tion. China shuns the status of a hegemonic superpower (chaojidaguo) 
but has begun to accept its status as a country with responsibilities 
(fuzeguo), which should assume a geo-political weight in the world that 
would correspond to its global economic weight (Hu 2005a, 2005b; Qin 
2005; Voskressenski 2005). 
If we compare the situation in China with the status of the European 
Union as a whole, not with individual countries such as Spain, France, 
Germany or the UK, then the problems that arise in an EU context take 
on a new perspective and are more similar to China's problems: territo-
rial cohesion, ethnic conﬂicts, religious conﬂicts, a democratic deﬁcit, 
economic inequalities, domestic migration, a failed state (Northern 
Ireland), a divided country (Cyprus), nations without states, experi-
ences of transition from Fascist and Soviet dictatorships to democracy, 
modernization of the economy, reform of the labour market, a monetary 
union. In this regard it is interesting to note the need experienced by the 
European Union, as part of its supranational evolution, to create a fourth 
estate of power, in addition to the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of traditional liberal democracy: the European Commission, 
a governing body made up of technocrats who are selected rather than 
Golden.indd   90 17-12-2011   13:28:44
_________________________________________________________________________91
______China's Perception of Risk and the Concept of Comprehensive National Power
elected, to formulate policies and ensure continuity. In many ways it 
resembles the 'mandarinate', the bureaucracy of technocrats that the 
Chinese empire felt the need to create and maintain more than two mil-
lennia ago. It would appear that a supranational entity like the EU needs 
additional organs, distinct from the executive, legislative and judiciary 
that characterize the nation-state of liberal democracy. In the case of the 
People's Republic, a bureaucracy of technocrats has been maintained 
but the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government have 
not (yet) been separated. 
The Perception of Risk from a Chinese Perspective 
In his proposal for a 中國大戰略 Zhongguo da zhanlue ('Grand Strategy 
for China'), the economist 胡鞍钢 Hu Angang summarizes the impor-
tance of China's peaceful (re)emergence by saying that the fact that the 
Chinese people, with a population of more than one billion, should 
become a moderately prosperous society [小康社会 xiaokang shehui] is 
of great importance in the history of human development. He calculates 
the population of the highest-income countries as less than 900 million, 
but says it cost them more than 200 years to reach today's level, count-
ing from the period of the industrial revolution. The population of 
countries with medium incomes is less than 600 million, but they took 
about 100 years to reach today's level, from the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The combined populations of these two types of countries 
is 1,470 million, representing 25% of the world's total. Hu states that 
China, in just 100 years, the period from 1950 to 2050, will have brought 
its population of between 1,500 million and 1,600 million people, to the 
level of moderately developed countries, creating a miracle of human 
development (Hu 2003). 
The party-state's capacity to perform this transformation, maintain-
ing institutional stability and a sustained rate of economic growth (ef-
ﬁciency), and equitably distributing wealth (equity) is the factor that 
gives it political legitimacy. Therefore, there are three key elements for 
the country's future: stability, efﬁciency and equity. The risk aversion 
that characterizes China's traditional culture helps in maintaining sta-
bility, but any event or process that could interfere with efﬁciency or 
equity, or the sum of various destabilizing factors, could precipitate a 
crisis in the People's Republic. For this reason, the party-state and its 
advisors are dedicated to the analysis of risk factors that could become 
threats or risks, and to developing risk management strategies. Table 
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TABLE 6: The Perception of Risk from a Chinese Perspective
Domestic risks: International risks:
• centrifugal socio-economic forces 
• uneven regional development 
• rural-urban divide
• urbanization of a rural population (risk 
of Latin Americanization)
• shortage of resources (raw materials, 
energy) 
• environmental degradation ('green' 
GDP) 
• corruption ('white' GDP) 
• social welfare (aging, education, health, 
unemployment) 
• consolidation of a domestic consumer 
market 
• climate change, natural disasters 
• epidemics 
• organized crime 
• political legitimacy of the party-state
• ethnic conﬂict 
• nationalism 
• populism 
• democratization of a large country 
(daguo)
• barriers to regionalization 
• shortage of resources (raw materials, 
energy, transport) 
• access to markets (protectionism, trans-
port, piracy) 
• ﬁnancial crises (e.g., 1997, 2008) 
• cross-border environmental degrada-
tion 
• climate change, natural disasters 
• pandemics
• security (Taiwan, anti-missile defense 
shield, US military presence, the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization) 
• cross-border ethnic conﬂicts 
• international terrorism 
• international organized crime 
• proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction 
• destabilizing external interference 
(Latin Americanization of China) 
• international responsibility (fuzeguo)
6 summarizes the kind of domestic or international risks that threaten 
the policy described by Hu Angang. 
Domestically, uneven economic development generates centrifugal 
socio-economic forces. The inequalities of development between coastal 
regions and the hinterland and between the countryside and cities create 
a huge 'ﬂoating' population of cheap and unskilled labour that migrates 
to the cities to ﬁnd work. But the cities cannot absorb the domestic mi-
grant population. The privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises 
generates unemployment in a context that does not include the guaran-
tees or support of a welfare state. Some economists such as 温铁军 Wen 
Tiejun warn that the sudden urbanization of the rural population carries 
the risk of a 'Latin Americanization' of the country. They have studied 
the results of this process in Latin America and identiﬁed the social and 
economic risks (poverty, marginalization, crime) that accompany the 
creation of slums (favelas) and hinder the economic growth of a develop-
ing country (Wen 2005). In this sense, any problem that interferes with 
the sustained development of China's economy is a threat to stability. 
China suffers a shortage of natural resources, both raw materials and 
energy resources (except highly polluting coal), which are essential for 
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industrialization. At the same time, industrialization leads to serious 
environmental degradation, in addition to the effects of climate change 
and natural disasters, which Chinese economists deﬁne as a 'green' GDP 
that takes into account the negative effects of environmental degradation 
on development. Another negative factor for development is corrup-
tion, which they call the 'white' GDP. The social costs of development 
and the need to create a network of social welfare for a population that 
has begun to age are very high. The engine of recent Chinese growth 
has been exports, but the only guarantee of economic stability for the 
future is the consolidation of a domestic consumer market, a return to 
the kind of self-sufﬁcient economy that made the Chinese empire strong 
until the nineteenth century. Medical problems such as SARS or avian 
inﬂuenza have highlighted the potential economic costs of epidemics. 
Organized crime has returned and represents a signiﬁcant cost, as do 
ethnic conﬂicts and separatism. 
Its ability to manage these risks is what determines the legitimacy 
of the party-state. There is no separation between the party and the 
administration or the public service in the People's Republic, a situ-
ation that hinders any possibility of alternation in power in the short 
to medium term. Still, the possibility of a loss of legitimacy because 
of the mismanagement of any of these risks—or the sum of various 
risks—could precipitate social movements that could alter the political 
status quo. In this case, populist nationalism could become a viscerally 
attractive force capable of ousting the Chinese Communist Party. For 
some advisers, such as 俞可平 Yu Keping,  the political management of 
these risks requires the maintenance of sustained but also sustainable 
economic growth, and an equitable redistribution of wealth, accompa-
nied by political reform—democratization—that should take place in 
a gradual and balanced way in accordance with the circumstances of a 
very large country (daguo) (Yu 2009). 
Internationally, there are several factors that could destabilize the 
party-state of the People's Republic. The regionalization of East Asia and 
Southeast Asia (ASEAN +3, ASEAN +6, the East Asia Summit) and the 
creation of a monetary union (the 'Asian dollar') in order to withstand 
ﬁnancial crises (as in 1997) are self-defense strategies of great interest to 
China in a global economy. Any obstacle to regionalization, such as the 
reluctance of Japan or US interference, could threaten this process. The 
scarcity of natural resources essential for industrialization forces China 
to compete for them on an increasingly more expensive international 
market. Any hindrance to China's access to raw materials or energy 
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sources would lead to risk. The same goes for access to markets as a result 
of protectionist policies or interference with transport (for this reason 
China is actively involved in the control of piracy and preoccupied by 
the presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the waters Chinese cargo ships 
must navigate). Environmental degradation crosses borders, as do the 
effects of climate change, natural disasters and pandemics. 
In the security ﬁeld, China feels an urgent need to defend its sover-
eignty and territorial integrity. The 'unequal treaties' of the imperialist 
era, which in China is called the 百年国耻 bainian guochi, 'century of 
humiliation', imposed extraterritoriality and stripped sovereignty from 
the Chinese empire. The nation-states that justiﬁed their incursions into 
China based on their own sovereignty did not recognize Chinese sover-
eignty. To deal with these former aggressors on an equal footing, China 
must demonstrate its ability to consolidate and defend its own territorial 
integrity, which implies, in part, the recovery of land expropriated by 
imperialism (Taiwan) and the repression of separatist movements (Tibet, 
Xinjiang). China sees another threat in the United States's military pres-
ence in the Asia-Paciﬁc region (the Seventh Fleet, the proposed missile 
shield that excludes China, covert support to Taiwan), or in Central Asia, 
which could also interfere with China's commercial trade or the trans-
portation of raw materials and energy sources. For this reason, China 
promotes the consolidation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) as a counterweight to US strategies and/or NATO, and as a factor 
promoting geo-political multipolarity. China shares borders and ethnic 
groups with several countries where transnational trends carry the risk 
of separatist movements across national borders, a phenomenon parallel 
to the dangers of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime. In 
various ﬁelds, Chinese advisers perceive the possibility of destabilizing 
interference promoted by foreign powers (such as the Latin Americani-
zation of China), while fearing that demands from the UN, the US or the 
EU that China assume a responsibility in international politics (fuzeguo) 
proportional to its global economic weight, could force China to give 
its approval to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. 
If China accepted the possibility of such interference, it could itself 
become subject to interference in the case of a possible intervention in 
Taiwan, something that China considers to be a domestic matter, a mat-
ter of its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, if China 
participates in international intervention policies, it could be exposed 
to military losses and terrorist reprisals.
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Case Studies of the Perception of Risk  
from a Chinese Perspective 
The following analysis of risks (Table 7) that threaten the sustainability 
of Chinese growth made by the RAND Corporation, a US think-tank, 
helps to highlight the distinctions between the Chinese perception of 
risk and the Euro-American perception. 
TABLE 7: RAND Corporation Analysis of Risks for the Sustainability 
of Chinese Growth
Risk factors
Cost 
(negative 
GDP)
1. Institutional
• ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial unemployed, poverty and social instability 
due to structural reforms as a result of entering the WTO, unequal 
distribution of income
3.0% - 6.0%
• various kinds of corruption ('white' GDP) 5.0%
2. Sectorial
• epidemics 1.8% - 2.2%
• shortage of water resources in northern China, worsening environ-
mental degradation, diversion of water from some southern rivers 
to the north ('green' GDP)
1.0% - 2.0%
• declining supply of energy resources on a worldwide level 1.0%
3. Financial
• nonperforming loans (NPLs), capital ﬂight, debts unpaid by state-
owned enterprises 
0.9% - 1.3%
• reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.8% - 1.6%
4. Conﬂicts
• Taiwan, Korean Peninsula, India, Pakistan, other factors of uncer-
tainty
1.0% - 1.3%
Potential economic loss of GDP according to RAND 14.5 – 18.4%
Source: Hu 2003.
Hu Angang (2003) said that RAND researchers had noted in their 
report that even if only one of these eight factors occurred at any given 
time, China's economy would be seriously affected. In his own analysis, 
Hu used somewhat different factors and weighted them differently as 
well, with even more critical results (Table 8).
This analysis of risks for the sustainability of Chinese growth offers 
pessimistic scenarios much worse than those described by the RAND 
analysts, partly because Hu tries to quantify the costs of environmental 
degradation ('green' GDP) and corruption ('white' GDP), which is an 
exercise Euro-American economists shun, and also because Chinese 
analysts may have better access to more relevant and reliable statistics. 
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TABLE 8: Hu Angang's Analysis of Risks for the Sustainability  
of Chinese Growth
Risk factors
Cost
(negative 
GDP)
• a high rate of unemployment represents mismanagement and 
waste of the work-force
7.0% - 8.0%
• the inﬂuence of various kinds of corruption and monopoly ('white' 
GDP)
14.0% -15.0%
• economic losses caused by various kinds of natural disaster 3.0% - 5.0%
• shortage of water resources in northern China, worsening pollu-
tion, project transferring water from some rivers south to north 
('green' GDP)
1.0% - 2.0%
• the loss of natural resources 4.5%
• the production and sale of adulterated, counterfeit and substand-
ard quality goods, violation of intellectual property rights and 
piracy
2.0% - 3.0%
• reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.8% - 1.6%
Potential economic loss of GDP according to  Hu Angang 30.5% - 35.5%
Source: Hu 2003
In any case, it suggests that Chinese leaders design their strategies for 
managing risks to the sustainability of Chinese growth—and therefore 
their own political survival—with better knowledge and a more realistic 
approach than do foreign analysts. 
China's Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in 
Comparison with Other Countries
Perhaps the most emblematic example of the contemporary Chinese 
perception of risk is the development of the concept of 综合国力 zonghe 
guoli or comprehensive national power (CNP), which many Chinese analysts 
consider the most important Chinese contribution to international rela-
tions theory (Wang 1996; Pillsbury 2000; Hu & Men 2002; Kang 2005; 
Anguiano 2008; Lampton 2008; Leonard 2008). 
The Department of Defence of the United States differentiates a few elements 
of China's politico-military strategy. ... On the military front they are aware 
of the 'Grand Strategy' project that China's leaders deﬁned as 'the overall 
strategy of a nation or alliance of nations which brings into play the whole 
of the nation's strength' to achieve political goals, especially those related 
to national security and development. ... There are two key issues in the 
Chinese conception of how to achieve this balance of priorities: the idea 
of 'comprehensive national power' (CNP) and the 'strategic conﬁguration 
of power' or [勢] shi. CNP is how China's strategists evaluate and measure 
national power in their own country, in comparison with that of others, 
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including the quantitative and qualitative extent of territory, natural 
resources, economic power, diplomatic inﬂuence, military capabilities 
and cultural inﬂuence.... The 'strategic conﬁguration of power'—shi—is 
roughly equivalent to the concept of the foreign 'alignment of forces' whose 
challenges, threats and opportunities must be properly assessed in order to 
readjust the national strategy (Anguiano 2008: 60-61). 
Michael Pillsbury analyzed the origins and development of the con-
temporary Chinese concept of comprehensive national power in great detail 
(Pillsbury 2000). He cites 吴春秋 Wu Chunqiu of the Academy of Military 
Science of the People's Liberation Army (PLA AMS) (军事科学研究院 
Junshi Kexue Yan Jiu Yuan), who attributes to ancient Chinese military 
strategists an early version of CNP: 'China's wise ancient strategists 
never advocated relying only on military power to conquer the enemy, 
but emphasized combining military power with the nonmilitary power 
related to war in order to get the upper hand' (Pillsbury 1991: 107-108). 
Wu cites Sunzi's 'ﬁve things' and 'seven stratagems' that governed the 
outcome of war, and says that pondering these components, which 
include politics, military affairs, economics, geography, and 'subjective 
guidance', could forecast the results of a war in advance. The Art of War 
by吳子 Wuzi deﬁnes six conditions under which war should be avoided 
if the other side's strength was greater, including the factors of national 
territory, population, domestic embodiment power, the legal system, 
servants, the quantity and quality of troops, as well as international aid. 
Wu concludes that even in an assessment based on modern views, these 
factors are relatively complete and are the epitome of comprehensive 
national power, as are the 'eight views' discussed by 管子Guanzi that 
show the size, strength, and development of a country's national power 
(Pillsbury 1999; cf. Pillsbury 2000; Wu 1995: 98; Huang 1992).
Pillsbury also cites 黄硕风 Huang Shuofeng of the PLA AMS, who 
said that Deng Xiaoping asked Chinese scholars in 1984 to analyze the 
future security environment, as part of a study on China's national 
defense strategy for the year 2000. Huang describes CNP as a complex 
system composed of four major index subsystems —the material power 
(hard) index subsystem, the spirit power (soft) index subsystem, the 
coordinated power index subsystem, and the environmental index sub-
system. The material power and spirit power indexes reﬂect the strength 
a country needs for survival and development; the coordinated power 
index reﬂects the leadership's organization, command, management, 
and decision-making levels; and the environmental index reﬂects the 
restricting conditions of comprehensive national power. Material power 
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includes hard factors (natural resources, economics, science and tech-
nology, and national defense) and some soft factors (national defense 
ideology and military theory). Spiritual and intellect power includes soft 
factors (politics, foreign affairs and culture and education). For each of 
these sub-subindices, Huang provides detailed lists of their contents, but 
only four of Huang's lists are seen here for comparison, two from the 
soft factor side, and two from the hard factor side (Table 9) (Pillsbury 
2000; cf. Huang 1992):
TABLE 9: People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Science 
(PLA AMS) Subsystems and Subindices of Comprehensive 
National Power
Subsystem Subindex
Political power • national strategy goals
 • political stability
 • policy level
 • the nation's leadership, organization, and decision-making 
capability
 • national embodiment power
Foreign affairs power • foreign political relations
 • foreign economic relations
 • foreign military relations
 • diplomatic activities capability
 • international contribution capability
Science and technology 
power
• science and technology troops (scientists and engineers, techno-
logical personnel)
 • investment in science and technology (total, proportion of the 
GNP)
 • science and technology level (high science and technology, 
general science and technology)
 • science and technology system
 • scientiﬁc and technological progress speed
 • scientiﬁc and technological progress contribution
 • scientiﬁc and technological results and applications
National defense power
 
 
 
 
 
• standing army (nuclear, conventional) and reserve forces
• national defense investment
• national defense science and technology and national defense 
industry
• national defense bases and installations
• strategic material reserves and logistics safeguards
• national defense education and training
• national defense system establishment
• national defense ideology of the people and troop morale
Sources: Pillsbury 2000, Huang 1992.
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TABLE 10: Categories and Indicators of CNP  
(Hu Angang & Men Honghua)
Categories Indicators
Economic resources
 
• GDP in PPP
• % World GDP
Human capital
 
• % of 15-64 year old people in the world's total
• average years of schooling
Natural resources
 
 
 
• electricity production
• commercial energy use
• arable land
• freshwater withdrawals
Capital resources
 
 
• Gross Domestic Investment
• Capital market value
• net FDI
Knowledge & technological re-
sources
 
 
 
 
• personal computers
• patent applications ﬁled by residents
• scientiﬁc & technical journal articles
• internet hosts
• R&D spending
Governmental resources
 
• % of central spending in GDP
• % of central spending in world's total
Military resources
 
• armed forces personnel
• military expenditures
International resources
 
 
• exports & service
• imports and service
• royalty and license fees receipts
Sources: Hu & Men 2002; Porter 1992, 2000.
There are several Chinese think-tanks involved in the calculation of 
comprehensive national power through various and differing combina-
tions of statistical indicators. Hu Angang 胡鞍钢 and Men Honghua 门
洪华 attribute the concept explicitly to 孫子兵法 Sunzi bingfa, and quote 
the beginning of that text with the same ﬁve factors discussed earlier 
in this study: 
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, 
a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no 
account be neglected. The art of war, then, is governed by ﬁve constant factors, 
to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the 
conditions obtained in the ﬁeld. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) 
Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline (Hu & Men 2002: 1). 
For Hu and Men, CNP means 'the sum total of the powers or strengths 
of a country in economy, military affairs, science and technology, educa-
tion and resources and its inﬂuence'. It combines all the powers possessed 
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by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, 
'including material and ideational ethos, and international inﬂuence'. It 
measures the basic national conditions and resources of a country, and 
the economic, political, military and technical powers of a country. CNP 
stresses comprehensiveness and all aspects, 'including material strength, 
ideational ethos and international inﬂuence' (Hu & Men 2002: 2).
CNP may be simply deﬁned as the comprehensive capabilities of a country 
to pursue its strategic objectives by taking actions internationally and the 
core factors to the concept are strategic resources, strategic capabilities and 
strategic outcomes, with the strategic resources as the material base (Hu & 
Men 2002: 3).
Although their study concentrates on 'hard power' elements of CNP, 
they also stress the importance of 'soft power' elements, including cul-
ture (since then the Chinese government has also launched more than 
300 'Confucius Institutes' in more than 90 countries as part of its overall 
CNP strategy). On the basis of Michael Porter's categories of physical 
resources, human resources, infrastructure, knowledge resources and 
capital resources, they divided national strategic resources into eight 
categories, with 23 indicators, in order to calculate CNP (Table 10).
Their application of these categories and indicators to an analysis 
of the comparative CNP of ﬁve major powers produced the following 
result (Table 11). On the basis of this comparative analysis, Hu and Men 
offered the following example of a comprehensive national power rank-
ing among some of the world powers (Table 12). Michael Pillsbury also 
detailed the categories and indicators used by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (中国社会科学院 Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan), which are 
outlined in Table 13. The differing choice of categories and indicators, as 
well as differing systems of weighting them, produce different results 
in the overall rankings. Pillsbury attributes part of the difference to the 
'military' nature of the PLA AMS approach and the 'civilian' nature of 
the CASS approach, summarized by Table 14.
According to Pillsbury, the 'military' approach was consistent with 'the 
orthodox Chinese view that a multipolar world structure is emerging 
and that US hegemony is ending', while the 'civilian' approach contra-
dicted 'the orthodox view about an emerging multipolar structure'. 
The most striking contrast is the assessment of China's growth rate relative 
to the United States. … The civilian team does not rank China equal to the 
United States by 2020 but merely ranks it number [seven] in the world 
… Chinese military authors assert that national power scores probably 
determine the outcome of wars. If so, the Chinese military team's quantitative 
results suggest China has little to fear from Japanese national power by 2010 
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TABLE 11: Strategic Resources and CNP of Five Major Powers  
(Percentage of World Total)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 Variation  1980-1998
Economic resources
China 3.10 4.57 5.63 8.87 10.23 7.07
India 3.36 3.80 4.35 5.02 5.41 2.05
Japan 8.04 8.27 8.73 8.38 7.82 -0.22
Russia   5.43 3.02 2.52  
USA 21.96 21.60 20.85 20.73 21.29 -0.67
Five in total   44.99 46.02 47.27  
Human capital (1999)  
China 17.60 18.70 20.20 21.90 24.00 6.40
India 8.40 9.06 9.98 11.10 12.30 3.90
Japan 4.36 4.01 3.73 3.55 3.27 -1.09
Russia 5.69 5.30 5.05 4.26 4.06 -1.63
USA 1.16 1.02 9.30 9.01 8.60 -3.00
Five in total 47.70 47.20 48.20 49.80 52.2 0.45
Natural resources
China 8.65 8.57 9.30 9.62 9.64 1.23
India 6.68 6.75 6.97 6.59 6.68 0.00
Japan 3.34 3.23 3.41 3.54 3.48 0.20
Russia   7.57 7.10   
USA 18.29 16.81 16.42 15.95 16.02 -2.44
Five in total   43.26 42.84   
Capital resources
China 2.21 3.81 3.87 10.00 9.40 7.19
India 1.50 2.16 2.00 2.70 2.50 1.00
Japan 5.25 5.52 14.40 10.50 6.90 1.65
Russia   1.50 0.90   
USA 23.02 20.33 23.40 23.80 31.10 8.08
Five in total  43.67 48.50 50.80   
Knowledge and technological resources
China 0.79 0.94 1.01 1.34 1.85 1.06
India 2.23 2.01 1.23 0.85 1.06 -1.17
Japan 8.23 9.17 8.56 15.32 14.70 6.47
Russia  0.08 1.76 1.61   
USA 32.69 32.80 34.26 34.59 34.93 2.24
Five in total  45.14 53.86 54.15 10.21  
Governmental resources
China 1.84 1.48 1.16 1.03 1.15 -0.69
India 1.63 2.10 2.66 2.46 2.72 1.09
Japan 5.83 5.18 5.24 7.60 7.60 1.77
Russia   2.60 2.60   
USA 19.10 19.00 18.70 15.90 15.80 -3.3
Five in total   29.05 29.870   
Military resources
China  8.57 7.91 7.31 7.40 -1.17
India  3.97 4.14 5.01 5.96 1.99
Japan 1.50  1.84 2.38 2.34 0.84
Russia   6.40 5.94   
USA 21.07 21.24 21.55 19.83 21.07 -1.24
Five in total   42.65 41.47   
International resources
China 0.59 0.91 0.74 1.35 1.83 1.24
India 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.55 0.15
Japan 7.55 9.05 9.97 10.38 8.80 1.25
Russia    0.82 0.73  
USA 22.47 24.01 22.10 22.18 24.23 1.76
Five in total    35.21 36.14  
Source: Hu & Men 2002.
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TABLE 12: Hu Angang & Men Honghua's CNP Index for Five Powers 
(Percentage of World Total)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 Variation 1980–2003
China 4.74 5.31 5.65 7.16 8.77 9.99 5.26
India 3.38 3.62 3.74 4.01 4.54 4.87 1.49
Japan 6.04 6.34 7.32 8.54 7.73 7.00 0.00
Russia 3.27 2.81 2.93 2.93
US 22.49 22.02 22.14 21.90 22.52 22.27 -2.21
TOTAL 42.11 41.61 46.48 47.07
Sources: Hu & Men 2002, updated in 2007 by Hu Angang (cf. Lampton 2008: 23).
and still less by 2020 when Japan will slip to fourth place. Better still, in 
terms of military threats to China, the military team's results suggest China 
will have three-fourths of the power score of the United States by 2010 and 
become co-equal to the United States by 2020 (Pillsbury 2000).
A.I. Johnston compared Pillsbury's analysis of the PLA AMS and 
CASS results to those of the China Institute of Contemporary Interna-
tional Relations (CICIR) (中国现代国际关系研究所 Zhongguo xiandai 
guoji guanxi yanjiusuo) (see Figure 4). 
FIGURE 4: Chinese Estimates of Trends in Comprehensive National 
Power
Sources: Johnston 2002, CICIR 2000.
Notes: ' "CIRIC (5%)" refers to an estimate by the Chinese Institute of Contemporary In-
ternational Relations … that assumes a ﬁve percent growth in China's CNP and a three 
percent growth in American CNP. CICIR (7%) [estimates] a seven percent growth rate 
for China's CNP' (Johnston 2002: 51).
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TABLE 13: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)  
CNP Indicators
Natural resources Manpower Resources: total population; life expectancy; proportion of 
the economically active population in the total population; number of 
university students per 10,000 people
Land Resources: extent of national territory; amount of arable land; 
forests
Mineral Resources (reserves): iron; copper; bauxite
Energy Resources (reserves): coal; crude oil; natural gases; water energy  
Economic activities 
capability
Actual Economic Strength (per person): GDP per capita; industrial pro-
duction capability (electric energy production, steel output, cement 
output, timber output); food supply capability (total grain output, av-
erage calories per capita); energy supply capability (volume of energy 
consumption)
Production Efﬁciency: social labour production rate; industrial labour 
production rate, agricultural labour production rate
Material Consumption Level: volume of energy consumption based on 
GDP calculations
Structure: the proportion of the tertiary sector in total GDP  
Foreign economic 
activities capability
Total import and export trade; total import trade, total export trade 
Total international reserves; international reserves (not including gold); 
gold reserves 
Scientiﬁc and techno-
logical capability
Proportion of research and development in the GDP; number of sci-
entists and engineers; the number of scientists and engineers per 1,000 
people; proportion of machinery and transportation equipment exports 
in total exports; proportion of high-technology-intensive exports in total 
exports 
Social development 
level
Education Level: education expenditures per capita; proportion of people 
studying in higher education; proportion of people studying in second-
ary school education
Cultural Level: adult literacy rate; number of people per one thousand 
who get a daily newspaper  
Health Care Level: health care expenditures per capita; number of people 
per doctor; number of people per nurse
Communications: number of people who have a telephone per 100 peo-
ple
Urbanization: Proportion of the urban population in the total popula-
tion
Military capability Number of military personnel; military expenditures; weapons exports; 
nuclear weapons (the number of nuclear launchers; the number of nu-
clear warheads) 
Government regu-
lation and control 
capability
Proportion of ﬁnal government consumption expenditures in the GDP; 
proportion of central government expenditures in the GDP; investigation 
through interviews asking nine questions 
Foreign affairs capa-
bility
Uses ten factors in a 'nerve network model' to carry out a broad assess-
ment
Sources: Pillsbury 2000, Wang 1996.
Golden.indd   103 17-12-2011   13:28:45
104 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 29(2)•2011
Sean Golden _______________________________________________________________
All of these results were projections made a decade or more ago. The 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences publishes an annual 国际形势黄
皮书 Guoji zhengzhì huangpishu (Yellow Book of International Politics), 
that measures and updates—among other things—the economic, social, 
diplomatic and military power of 11 major nations: Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom 
and the United States. The results published for 2010 make it possible to 
compare the earlier CASS projections with the current statistical analysis, 
in accordance with the CASS indicators (see Table 15).
A recent study by US State Department ofﬁcial Richard M. Eason 
summarizes the Chinese concept of comprehensive national power and 
comments on its implications for the United States. He deﬁnes CNP as 
'a quantiﬁable measurement…based…on measures of territory, natu-
ral resources, economic prosperity, diplomatic inﬂuence, international 
prestige, domestic cohesiveness, military capability, and cultural inﬂu-
ence' and concludes:
TABLE 14: Comparison of AMS and CASS Projections of CNP and 
Rankings to 2020
AMS CASS
Country 1989 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020
USA
593.33    
(1)
816.85    
(1)
1,066.21  
(1)
1,391.71  
(1)
279    
(1)
241     
(1)
213     
(1)
192    
(2)
USSR 
386.72    
(2)
648.34    
(2)
- -
184    
(2)
131     
(5)
121     
(6)
108    
(9)
Germany 
378.10    
(3)
558.23    
(3)
772.36    
(2)
1,068.63  
(3)
161    
(4)
162     
(3)
163     
(3)
164    
(3)
Japan 
368.04    
(4)
537.39    
(4)
736.35    
(4)
1,009.00  
(4)
162    
(3)
184     
(2)
206     
(2)
228    
(1)
France 
276.35    
(5)
384.93    
(6)
507.36    
(5)
668.73   
(6)
129    
(5)
141     
(4)
150     
(4)
157    
(4)
China 
222.33    
(6)
437.35    
(5)
768.57    
(3)
1350.63   
(2)
94    
(9)
102     
(8)
110     
(8)
118    
(7)
England 
214.08    
(7)
281.24    
(7)
353.05    
(8)
443.19   
(8)
116    
(6)
116     
(7)
115     
(7)
115    
(8)
Brazil 
156.05    
(8)
267.70    
(9)
419.72    
(7)
658.09   
(7)
62  
(12)
69   
(12)
75   
(11)
80  
(11)
India 
144.16    
(9)
274.08    
(8)
468.15    
(6)
799.67   
(5)
51  
(13)
53   
(13)
55   
(13)
57  
(13)
Canada 
136.64   
(10)
177.41  
(10)
220.56    
(9)
274.18   
(9)
100    
(8)
92     
(9)
86   
(10)
81  
(10)
Australia 
112.59   
(11)
147.91  
(11)
185.67  
(10)
233.07  
(10)
78  
(10)
71   
(11)
66   
(12)
62  
(12)
Sources: Pillsbury 2000, Huang 1992, Wang 1996.
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Throughout history, whenever a nation increases its strength and inﬂuence 
on the global level, other major powers must adjust. China is recovering 
from nearly two centuries of disruption and decline and is reasserting the 
major inﬂuential role it has had throughout much of history. This period of 
Chinese recovery will challenge the world's major powers, including United 
States. The U.S. will need to spend great effort in doing everything with 
[sic] its power to ensure that China's return to the world stage is peaceful. 
The U.S. must maintain a strong presence in East and Southeast Asia, not 
only military but diplomatic, economic and even cultural. The competition 
with China will be difﬁcult and at times tense. However, China and the U.S. 
have many interests in common. The key is to continue to build on those 
interests through a competition in which both the two countries, and the 
world, beneﬁt. A war between the world's two top economic powers would 
make the recent "Great Recession" look like a trial run for global economic 
catastrophe (Eason 2010).
The fact that Chinese strategists explicitly link their new theories of 
comprehensive national power to the ideas of ancient Chinese strate-
gists, combined with the desire to measure it through the balance of 
both quantitative and qualitative factors as did the ancient strategists, 
demonstrates the continuity of a long-term perception of risk with 
Chinese characteristics.
TABLE 15: CASS CNP Projections (1996) 
& Yellow Book Update (2010)
CASS 1996 CASS 2010
2000 Projection 2010 Projection Yellow Book Update
Country Rank Country Rank Country Rank
US 1 US 1 US 1
Japan 2 Japan 2 Japan 2
Germany 3 Germany 3 Germany 3
France 4 France 4 Canada 4
Russia 5 Italy 5 France 5
Italy 6 Russia 6 Russia 6
UK 7 UK 7 China 7 (+1)
China 8 China 8 UK 8 (-1)
Canada 9 South Korea 9 India 9 (+4)
South Korea 10 Canada 10 Italy 10 (-5)
Australia 11 Brazil 11 (+1) Brazil 11
Brazil 12 Australia 12 (-1)
India 13 India 13
Sources: Pillsbury 2000, Huang 1992, CASS 2010, cf. China Daily.
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Conclusions 
This study of China's perception of risk suggests the existence of a strong 
continuity over more than two millennia. Unlike the standard Euro-
American view of risk, which calculates the probability of something 
happening and its cost should it happen, as well as possible risk manage-
ment strategies, Chinese culture has traditionally had an aversion to risk, 
preferring harmony to disorder, and takes the methodology of analysis 
and calculation of risk of the ancient military treatise Sunzi Bingfa (The Art 
of War attributed to Sunzi) as a model for combining qualitative and quan-
titative factors in the development of various risk scenarios and various 
risk management strategies that are suitable to China's own culture and 
circumstances and designed both to avoid the worst and to achieve the 
best of any critical moment of risk. As a result, the analysis of domestic and 
foreign contexts that determine the type of risks that threaten the stability 
and development of China differs from the analysis resulting from the 
application of Euro-American paradigms, as evidenced by the compara-
tive study of analyses of risks for the sustainability of Chinese growth 
presented here. The development of the concept of comprehensive national 
power, with its origins in Sunzi and other ancient military strategists, 
which many Chinese analysts see as their most important contribution 
to theories of international relations, demonstrates the continuity—and 
continuing validity—of the Chinese perception of risk. 
Seán Golden is Professor of East Asian Studies and Director of the Institute of 
International and Intercultural Studies at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
(UAB). (sean.golden@uab.es)
NOTES
1  Part of the research for this study has been ﬁnanced by the Spanish government 
in the framework of Research Project FFI2008-05911 Procesos interculturales de Asia 
Oriental en la Sociedad Internacional de la Información: ciudadanía, género y producción 
cultural. INTERASIA. This study draws upon Golden 2010 and East Asia Net research 
workshops held at Lund University, Copenhagen Business School and Charles 
University in Prague.
2  Unless otherwise indicated, all translations by Seán Golden.
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